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new trial. 31 Courts also recognize, however,
that there is a level below which the actions
of the attorney cannot fall or the due process requirement will be violated.",
Upon a defendant's conviction, the defense counsel might well be expected to attempt to secure a new trial. However, the
state cannot be expected to provide a
forum when mere bad judgment of counsel,
or a failure of trial tactics, has resulted in
the defendant's evidence on the main trial
not being adequately introduced or exploited.32

If the Court in the instant case had
allowed a new trial merely because the defense counsel had not diligently established
the mental incompetence of a material witness, other attorneys might follow suit. By
obtaining a new trial as a result of a subsequent finding of the witness' insanity, the
defense counsel's position will invariably
be enhanced at the expense of a successful
prosecution. At the new trial the prosecu:31Tompsett v. State, 146 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 869 (1945).
31 See, e.g., United States v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407
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tor's case will have already been exposed
and the defense attorney would receive
the ultimate benefit resulting from his failure to perform effectively at the first trial.
Substantial justice can be best achieved
when the lawyer performs his moral, if not
legal, obligation by utilizing his best learning, ability and skill in his duties toward
his clients. : In this regard, all the available evidence and issues must be presented
to the jury. It appears that this was not
done in the present case and it is quite
possible that the Court granted a new trial
because of the counsel's inadvertence.
While the Court distinguished the Salemi
case from the instant decision, it failed to
clarify the incongruous result that a diligent defense precludes a new trial, while a
non-enthusiastic defense justifies a new
trial. Also to be clarified is the question of
whether a new trial would have been
granted if the trial court had informed the
jury of the material witness' mental condition when counsel failed to do so sufficiently.

(3d Cir. 1953).
32 Cf. Giaramita v. Flow Master Mach. Corp.,
234 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 1962).

3 See A.B.A. CANONS
Canon 15; WARVELLE,
§ 247 (2d ed. 1920).
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expressed is preferable to one in which
doubt, skepticism, or agnosticism is professed. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
reversed, holding that a religious belief
is not a relevant consideration in awarding
child custody unless that belief is inimical
to the welfare of the child. Welker v.
Welker, 129 N.W.2d 134 (Wis. Sup. Ct.
1964).
At common law the father had a paramount right to the custody of his minor

Although she attended a church, the
appellant-wife in a child-custody case considered herself an agnostic, since she had
some doubt as to the existence of a deity.
The trial court found both parties able
parents, but awarded custody to the husband, principally on the ground that a
home in which a firm faith in a deity is
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children.' Today, however, the "best interests" test is employed to determine custody, the primary consideration being the
2
welfare of the child.
The trial court enjoys a broad range of
discretion in determining the best interests
of the child and it considers many factors
in reaching its decision. The moral and
financial fitness of the parents, the preference of the child, and the age, health,
and sex of the child are principal factors. 3
The doctrine of religious neutrality in
custody cases has its roots in English law.4
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Protestantism was the established
religion in England, and the courts, rather
than being neutral, promoted the Church
of England. Early in the nineteenth century, however, the courts of England began
to take a more liberal view. In the case of
Lyons v. Blenkin6 it was held that the
court would look with equal favor on all
religions. The latter position gradually
evolved into the doctrine of religious neutrality, accepted by both English and
7
United States courts.
1

Porter v. Porter, 60 Fla. 407, 53 So. 546 (1910).

2 This is the test in substantially all jurisdictions.

For a collection of the cases see 17A AM. JUR.
Divorce and Separation § 818 (1957).
3Note, Religion-A Factor in Awarding Custody
of Infants, 31 So. CAL. L. REV. 313, 314 n.7
(1958).
4 See Lyons v. Blenkin, Jac. 245, 37 Eng. Rep. 842,

844 (Ch. 1821).
,5An example of the intolerance of the period is
the case of Preston v. Ferrard, 4 Bro. P.C. 298, 2
Eng. Rep. 202 (H.L. 1720), wherein a Catholic
widow was deprived of the custody of her child
solely on the basis of her religious belief. The
court awarded custody to a Protestant so that the
child might be raised in the Protestant faith.
6 Supra note 4.
7While English courts operated under the rule
that all religions were equal, they also operated
under the common-law rule that the father had
a paramount right to control the religious educa-

The Supreme Court of the United States
has apparently adopted a general policy
of religious neutrality. For example, in
Watson v. Jones," the Court stated that
"the law knows no heresy and is committed to the . . . establishment of no sect."'

On other occasions the Court has indicated
that the first amendment requires the state
to be neutral in its relations with groups
of religious believers and non-believers.'
It has also struck down laws and governmental practices which tend to favor one
religion over another, or religion over nonreligion.' The neutrality policy was stated
clearly in the Watson case:
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any
religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not . . . infringe
personal rights, is conceded to all.

Although the Supreme Court decisions
require religious neutrality, authority is
divided on the question of whether religion
tion of his children. In re Agar-Ellis, 10 Ch.D. 49
(1878). This rule of religio sequitur patrein prevailed until Parliament enacted the Guardianship
of Infants Act, 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 45 § 1 (1925).
This act abolished the rule of religio sequitur
patrem and declared that the welfare of the child
is the paramount consideration in custody proceedings. From this time the religion of the father was no longer controlling, and a true policy
of religious neutrality was established.

s 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
9 Id. at 728.
10 McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203

(1948).
11 In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961),
the Court struck down a statute which required
an affirmation of belief in God as a prerequisite to
holding public office. A state-sponsored school
prayer was declared unconstitutional in Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1961), and the Court reversed a Florida decision that would have allowed Bible reading in public schools in Dade
County Bd. of Pub. Instruction v. Hume, 143

So. 2d 21 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1962), rev'd, 347 U.S.
487 (1963).
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may be considered as a factor in a custody
award. The minority view is that religion
can be considered only when the religious
teachings would be inimical to the welfare
of the child. 12 Where the religious teachings of the parents are not subversive of
morality and decency, the court may not
consider religion as a factor in determin13
ing a custody award.
The majority rule permits the trial judge
to consider religion in making the determination of custody. While the factor of
religion may be considered, it can not be
singularly controlling, but must be considered with the other determinatives, e.g.,
age, sex and health.
The minority position is illustrated by
the Supreme Court of Kansas in Jackson v.
Jackson,14 where it stated that:
Aside from teachings subversive of morality and decency, and some others equally
obnoxious, the courts have no authority
over that part of a child's training which
consists in religious discipline, and in a dispute relating to custody, religious views afford no ground for depriving a parent of
custody who is otherwise qualified.
In Jackson, the husband and wife had separated, and the wife, a Jehovah's Witness,
had been awarded custody of their minor
children. The husband moved for change
of custody, alleging that the children would
be raised in a manner which would tend
to make them unpatriotic citizens in that
Refusal, on religious grounds, to have children
vaccinated was held to be inimical to their welfare
in Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816 (Ark. Sup. Ct.
1964). Refusal, on religious grounds, to allow
blood transfusions was held to be inimical to the
child's welfare in State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463,
181 A.2d 751 (1962).
13 Jackson v. Jackson, 181 Kan. 1, 309 P.2d 705
(1957).
14 id. at -,
309 P.2d at 711, quoting Denton v.
James, 107 Kan. 729, 193 Pac. 307 (1920).
'1
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their mother's religion would require them
to refuse to accept military service and to
claim the status of a conscientious objector.
The trial court, after receiving testimony
and exhibits as to the tenets of Jehovah's
Witnesses and the possible effects of such
beliefs on children, transferred custody of
the children to the husband. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Kansas reversed, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in allowing the matter of religion
to become an integral part of its decision.
The minority would require that a custody
award be made free from considerations
of religion.
The majority view was clearly verbalized
in the Oelberman Adoption Case,15 wherein the court stated that "religion is an important matter, and should be given consideration, but does not determine the right
to custody." The child in question, born
out of wedlock, was given to the care of a
couple by the mother. Thereafter, the
mother and putative father married and
sought to regain custody of the child. In
denying the parents' request, the court mentioned in passing the fact that the child
would be given religious training in its
foster home. 16
The case of Shearer v. Shearer17 indicates that New York follows the majority
view in allowing the trial judge to consider religion as a factor in custody proceedings. The court awarded custody of
the child to the non-Catholic mother, but
the Catholic father was given the right both
to take the child to Catholic church services and to see that the child received religious instructions. The court, in referring

15 167 Pa. Super. 407, 74 A.2d 790 (1950).
161d. at -, 74 A.2d at 794. (Emphasis added.)
17 73 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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to the father's religious beliefs, noted that
to him and his church, the religious upbringing of children is both a matter of an
infant's spiritualwelfare and of sound public policy."' The matter of religion was not
controlling in the Shearer case, but, in accordance with the majority position, was
considered by the court; this is clearly
shown by that part of the custody award
which allowed the father to supervise the
religious upbringing of the children.
The Court in the instant case reasoned
that since the first amendment protects both
the right to believe and the right to disbelieve, it could not consider the matter of
religion in determining the custody of a
child without violating the doctrine of religious neutrality. For this reason, the decision of the trial court, allowing religion
to be a factor in its determination, was reversed.
The minority viewpoint, adopted here,
lessens the importance of the accepted tests
of "best interests" and "welfare of the
child" since an elimination of religion as a
factor may result in an award of custody
which is not in the child's best interests.
To arrive at an award which will be in
the best interests of the child, the court
must consider all the relevant factors. In
some instances the child's prior religious
training may be a factor, since a change in
such training may, under certain circumstances, result in traumatic psychic consequences.1" If the court cannot consider the
factor of religion, the award may result in
13Id. at 359. (Emphasis added.)
19 Pfeffer, Religion In The Upbringing Of Children, 35 B.U.L. REv. 333, 371 (1955).

psychic injury to the child and thus frustrate the very purpose of the "best interests" test.
This does not mean that in every case
dealing with diversity of religion the child
should be awarded to the parent of the
same religion. But since each case involves
a different factual situation, a rule barring
religion as a factor in determining custody
would prevent the court from considering a
factor upon which, under certain circumstances, the best interests of the child might
depend. The rule limits the scope of the
court's inquiry, and in so doing may limit
the effectiveness of the court's determination regarding the best interests and welfare of the child.
The majority view appears to be -the
better approach since it allows the court a
wider scope of inquiry in its determination
of the award. It is interesting to note, however, that as a practical matter, religion may
influence the determination of a custody
award even in jurisdictions which follow the
minority view. Where evidence is introduced to show that one party's religious
views might be subversive of morality and
decency, even if it is found that the evidence does not establish this fact, the religious beliefs of at least one of the parties
will have been made known to the trial
judge. This knowledge will influence the
judge's determination to some degree, even
if he is not permitted to openly state that
the religious factor was considered. The
broad discretionary powers of the trial
judge will enable him to assign some nonreligious factor as a reason for the award,
even though the religious issue may in fact
have been important, if not controlling.

